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CHAPTER

1

Distinguishing Between Cognitive
and Social Values
HUGH LACEY

Chapter Overview
There is a methodologically important distinction between cognitive and social
values that can be readily discerned when cognitive values are conceived of as
criteria for evaluating how well a scientific theory provides understanding of a
phenomenon. Cognitive but not social values play essential roles in making the
judgment that a theory or hypothesis is impartially held of a set of phenomena.
However, social values have proper and ineliminable roles in other aspects of
science, for example, when adopting a theory for the sake of giving direction to a
research project, or endorsing a theoretically articulated hypothesis for the sake
of informing practical action. Arguments against there being a useful distinction
between cognitive and social values depend on conceptions of cognitive values
that do not facilitate distinguishing the different attitudes (holding impartially,
adopting, endorsing) that may be taken toward theories and hypotheses.

1. Introduction
Values are properties of an object that are deemed to be criteria for appraising its value and, when adequately possessed by it, to be indicators of its value
(its worth, goodness, or desirability). An object may be valued in various
ways. A scientific theory, for example, may be valued for its ability to provide well-founded understanding of phenomena—I will call this its cognitive
value; or for its potential to contribute to social ‘utility’—its social value. A
scientific theory provides well-founded understanding of phenomena when it
15
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provides descriptions of their features, identifies the mechanisms of how they
work and the causal factors that produce them, and indicates how they can
be transformed (often for technological ends) through interaction with other
phenomena. A theory could contribute to social utility by informing projects
that generate technological innovations, strengthen social justice and foster
human well-being, or further feminist objectives or the interests of particular
social groups.
I define cognitive values to be criteria for evaluating how adequate and well
founded is the understanding of phenomena that is incorporated in a scientific theory in the light of available empirical data obtained from observation
of these phenomena. Scientific understanding incorporates but is not reducible to knowledge of phenomena. The terms ‘cognitive values’ and ‘epistemic
values’ are often used more or less interchangeably. However, since epistemic
values tend to be characterized as criteria for evaluating knowledge or as indicators of truth, in order to avoid ambiguity, throughout my argument I refer to
cognitive values (criteria for evaluating understanding). Empirical adequacy,
explanatory power, capacity to identify possibilities that the phenomena enable
and allow, internal consistency, consistency with understanding of phenomena
that is well founded in other theories, and minimization of ad hoc hypotheses, are all exemplary cognitive values. They have been identified dialectically
in the course of the unfolding of the scientific tradition (Laudan 1984); they
are highly manifested in instances of well founded scientific understanding
and knowledge, and can be defended in the light of their mutual compatibility and accord with the aims and ideals of science (Lacey 1999); they are
widely appealed to in scientific practices, and learning how to deploy them is
built into programs for the formation of professional scientists. I define social
values to include criteria for evaluating social arrangements and systems—
for example, freedom, justice, democratic participation, property rights, and
equality—and also criteria for evaluating social institutions and practices, for
example, technological progress, economic growth, profit, and empowerment
of participants. Agents often disagree about what these criteria are and how
they should be ranked; when they do, I will say that they adhere to different
social values.
The distinction between cognitive and social values drawn with these definitions is an important one. More generally, distinguishing cognitive values
from all other kinds of values, including ethical, personal, economic, religious,
aesthetic values, is important. Here I address explicitly only social values, but
my conclusions about their proper roles in science are intended to hold for
all noncognitive values. As will be discussed in Section 3, cognitive values are
essential to evaluating whether a theory provides adequate and well-founded
understanding of a particular set of phenomena. I will say that a theory is
impartially held of a set of phenomena when it provides this kind of understanding, and also that the knowledge it incorporates of each phenomenon of the set
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is impartially held. Social values and other kinds of noncognitive values do not
have a proper role to play in evaluating that a theory is impartially held of a set
of phenomena. However, it is important to distinguish this attitude of impartially holding a theory of a set of phenomena from the attitudes of adopting a
theory, and endorsing a hypothesis about phenomena that is articulated using
a theory’s categories (Lacey 2015a). A theory is adopted when it is used for the
sake of framing and giving direction to ongoing research in a given scientific
area, and of testing the range of phenomena of which the theory can come to
incorporate understanding (see Section 4). A theoretically articulated hypothesis is endorsed when it is judged to be well enough supported by available
evidence to justify using it to inform actions or other practical matters (Section 5). Social values and other kinds of noncognitive values do have proper
roles to play in deciding what theories to adopt and whether to endorse theoretically articulated claims. Once these different attitudes are distinguished,
it is easier to grasp that the distinction between cognitive and social values is
methodologically important, and to identify the different but essential roles
that the two kinds of values play in particular aspects of science.

2. Arguments for Rejecting That the Distinction
Between Cognitive and Social Values Is Useful
Cognitive (epistemic) values became a major topic of discussion in contemporary philosophy of science largely in response to writings by Thomas Kuhn
(1977), Ernan McMullin (1983), and Larry Laudan (1984), all of whom maintain that scientific methodological procedures require making a distinction
between cognitive and noncognitive values. They and others have put forward
lists of what are considered to be exemplary cognitive values. The list compiled by Helen Longino is a typical one: empirical adequacy, consistency with
theories in other domains, simplicity, explanatory power/generality, fertility,
and refutability (Longino 2008, 69).1 Many philosophers of science maintain
that there is not a useful, methodologically important distinction between
cognitive and social values. Their arguments follow a common pattern. (In
Section 4.5, I will discuss in greater detail Longino’s particular version of the
argument.) They assume that, if there is a useful distinction, we should be able
to define cognitive values in a way that enables us to clearly determine whether
or not the items on a list like Longino’s are cognitive values, to the exclusion
of all social and other noncognitive values. Then, they argue that the definitions of cognitive values that they consider do not serve to pick out the items
on such a list to the exclusion of all social values; and, from this, they conclude
that there is not a useful distinction.
The following are typical of the definitions of cognitive values considered
in these arguments: ‘characteristic values of a good scientific theory’ (McMullin 1983, 18), ‘good reasons for accepting . . . a theory’ (Longino 2008, 74), and
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‘standard criteria for evaluating the adequacy of a theory’ (Kuhn 1977, 322);
and also: ‘values . . . constitutive of the knowledge and truth-seeking goals of
the enterprise of science’ (Rooney 1992), values involved in ‘scientific reasoning’ (Douglas 2009), and ‘acceptable values in science’ (Douglas 2009). There
are differences among these definitions. None of them, however, provides a
basis for distinguishing between the three attitudes of impartially holding a
theory of specified sets of phenomena, adopting a theory, and endorsing a
theoretically articulated claim. Instead, all of these attitudes tend to be lumped
together in an undifferentiated way under the category of ‘accepting a theory’
(Lacey 2015a). Then, the criteria for ‘accepting’ a theory, or judging it to be
‘adequate,’ are effectively considered to be of the same kinds regardless of the
attitude being taken toward the theory. In addition, ‘good theory’ and ‘scientific
reasoning’ are each treated effectively as univocal notions. Then, since social
values are indeed among the grounds for adopting theories (see Section 4)
and endorsing theoretically articulated claims (Section 5), they are among the
grounds for ‘accepting’ theories and among the criteria for identifying ‘good’
or ‘adequate’ theories. The items on the lists of cognitive values may also be
among these criteria, but not in a way that excludes social values also being so.
It follows that any list of cognitive values that is drawn up, separating them
from the social values that are also among the criteria, will be largely arbitrary
and not indicative of a methodologically important distinction.
This conclusion does not follow when cognitive values are defined (as in Section 1) as criteria for evaluating the understanding that a theory incorporates
with respect to a specified set of phenomena, and where the three attitudes are
kept separate and not lumped all together. Then, it can be taken into account
that the grounds for holding a theory impartially of a specified set of phenomena are different from the kinds of reasons required for adopting a theory and
for endorsing a theoretically articulated claim. And so, social values may be
among the reasons for adopting theories and endorsing theoretically articulated hypotheses but not for impartially holding a theory of a set of phenomena.
This would leave untouched that the criteria (cognitive values) for evaluating
well-founded scientific understanding are distinct from social values, and that
identifying them need not involve their being arbitrarily demarcated from social
values. This is consistent with the facts that the social values adhered to affect
what phenomena are investigated, and that any well-founded understanding
obtained in science is the outcome of research practices in which social values
may play indispensable roles; and it does not imply that being the outcome of
such practices is among the cognitive values (Lacey 2005). It also leaves open the
question of whether all the items on Longino’s list are cognitive values.
In the following sections, I will elaborate how it is important for scientific methodology to distinguish between the three attitudes: adopting, impartially holding,
and endorsing, and how doing so enables a compelling account to be given of the
different roles that cognitive and social values play in scientific practices.
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3. Keeping Cognitive and Social Values Separate:
Impartially Holding a Theory of a Set of Phenomena
Scientific practice is fraught with many uncertainties. Nevertheless, often that a
theory incorporates understanding of a specified set of phenomena becomes so
well founded and established that this needs no further testing—although this
leaves it open to further investigation to find out whether or not the theory can
provide understanding of a wider range of phenomena. For example, classical
mechanical theory is well founded and established as an account of terrestrial
motions; and textbooks of molecular chemistry and biology, nuclear physics,
studies of the viral and bacterial causation of disease, and electronic theory
applied to such technological objects as computers and television provide
numerous instances of theories so established. These are cases of theories being
impartially held of specified sets of phenomena (see Section 1). All of them also
have practical applications that have acclaimed social value. Moreover, some of
them (for example, a theory about bacterial causes of a particular disease) might
not have been adopted in investigation, if it had not been expected that socially
valued applications (a cure for the disease) would be forthcoming. These facts
about the social value of these theories are irrelevant, however, for judging
whether or not they are impartially held of the relevant sets of phenomena.
No social values are presupposed, or have a proper role alongside (or overriding) of the cognitive values, when a judgment of this kind is made. Then, the
only relevant consideration is whether or not the theories manifest the cognitive values to a high degree with respect to empirical data obtained by observing
the phenomena of which they are intended to provide understanding, and to
a sufficiently high degree that there actually remain no plausible reasons to
anticipate that further research on the matter would make any difference. While
it is always logically possible that further research might make a difference, it is
a norm of standard scientific practice that no further research is needed to test
such a judgment when (and only when) the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) all plausible, actually identified lines of research, which could produce results
that would lead to rejecting the judgment, have been fully pursued; (ii) all actually raised objections concerning the degree of manifestation of the cognitive
values in the theory with respect to the available empirical data—as well as
objections concerning the sufficiency of this data—have been addressed; and
(iii) after repeated efforts and a reasonable lapse of time, no additional objections, accompanied by specific research proposals, are anticipated.
Nevertheless, we can find plenty of cases where, in actual fact, social values
do play roles alongside the cognitive values when evaluations are made about
a theory incorporating well-founded understanding of a domain of phenomena. For example, feminist philosophers of science have pointed to cases
where sexist values play roles alongside the cognitive values (Longino 1992;
Kourany 2010). These have to do with theories that have been constrained to
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consistency with sexist value-laden claims (e.g., males as primary agents of
innovation or as having superior mathematical ability), and—ignoring that
conditions (i)–(iii) are not satisfied—treated as if they were impartially held
of the relevant phenomena. Evaluations of the cognitive value of these theories
are thereby distorted. Despite not being impartially held of phenomena that
they encompass, the theories are treated as if they are, and often used to give
alleged scientific cover to prejudicial attitudes and behavior. Distorted appraisals also can have problematic consequences in deliberations having to do with
regulatory and public-policy decisions.

4. Role for Social Values: Adopting a Theory
A theory is adopted when it is used for the sake of framing and giving direction to
ongoing research in a given scientific area, and of testing the range of phenomena of which the theory can come to incorporate understanding. The judgment
that a theory is impartially held of a specified set of phenomena is based on
outcomes of a process of research in which the theory had been adopted and
empirical data obtained by observing phenomena of the set. As we have seen,
social values have no proper role, alongside the cognitive values, when making a
judgment of this kind. However, they (and ethical, personal, and other noncognitive values) do play important roles when deciding to adopt the theory.
In 4.1, I will discuss ways in which social values may have direct and overt
roles when adopting theories; and then, in 4.2, how their roles are often overshadowed by the roles of two values, fertility and comprehensiveness, that
generally influence what theories are adopted. In 4.3, I will discuss the adoption
of what I call ‘decontextualizing theories,’ theories that have been remarkably
fertile and that are often said to be adopted for this reason. In 4.4, however, I
will show that adopting only decontextualizing theories is incompatible with
reaching accord with comprehensiveness. Then, I will argue that, where they
are adopted virtually exclusively, it is because they generally enable us to obtain
understanding that supports the social values of technological progress and of
capital and the market, sometimes at the expense of other social values, such
as those of social justice and democratic participation. Hence, decisions made
about whether to adopt these or other theories may be enmeshed in these
social values. Finally, in 4.5, by recognizing the role of social values in decisions
about which theories to adopt, I will show that Longino’s particular version of
the form of argument (discussed in Section 2), that there is not an important
distinction between cognitive and social values, does not succeed.
4.1

Direct Roles of Social Values in Supporting the Adoption of Theories

Consider, for example, that scientists may adopt a theory in biotechnology
in order to gain more understanding of genetically modified (GM) crops,
because they value socially the contribution that using those crops can make to
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technological progress, to economic growth, or to increasing the world’s food
supply. This research has led to impartially held results, such as that certain
kinds of GM crops are resistant to the herbicide glyphosate (the active ingredient in the widely used RoundUp). Other scientists, without denying that results
like this are impartially held, question the social value of using GM crops, in
part because of concerns about risks (see Section 5), and partly because they
consider some other approaches to agriculture such as agroecology to have
greater social value, since they consider them more likely to contribute to social
justice and to maintain environmental sustainability (Section 4.4). They, in
turn, adopt theories in agroecological research (in which agricultural production is investigated without being separated from such factors as sustainability,
preservation of biodiversity, and the health and values of communities of family farmers), and they expect to obtain results that can meet the requirements
of being impartially held (Lacey 2015b, 2016). Depending on the social values
they adhere to, scientists may adopt theories of biotechnology or of agroecology. In both cases, the research conducted can lead to obtaining impartially
held knowledge, but of different sets of phenomena. The value conflicts that
occur in connection with adopting theories are not as such an impediment
to obtaining impartially held knowledge. Those adhering to the social values
that motivate engagement in (for example) biotechnology, however, may deny
that there is much social value to obtaining agroecological knowledge, and so
oppose providing agroecology with the resources needed for its development;
and (if they control access to funding and other resources) this may lead to
little agroecological knowledge being gained. This helps to make clear that, if
the relevant social values are not held by some scientists, the theories whose
adoption would be motivated by them might not be explored, and so wellfounded understanding might not be obtained of certain kinds of phenomena.
More generally, the social values that are embodied in scientific practices and
institutions have impact on the character, dynamic, and texture of the practices (experiment, development and testing of theories, instrumental design
and innovation, meetings, discussions, publication, etc.)—when, where, and by
whom they are conducted and who is considered a participant in them, their
priorities, norms of inquiry, and how rapidly and extensively they unfold, what
kinds of theories are adopted, what phenomena are and can be investigated in
them and, hence, of what phenomena understanding can be gained. The social
values involved in the examples of biotechnology and agroecology derive from
broad social and ethical goals, and they may be reinforced by personal goals of
scientists having to do with prestige, career advancement, or wealth.
4.2 Fertility and Comprehensiveness of Adopted Theories
Social values of these kinds need not be so directly involved when adopting
a theory. Scientists may be motivated simply to bring about the expansion
of well-established knowledge and understanding, regardless of its potential
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practical application. Indeed, scientific institutions tend to affirm that fertility
and comprehensiveness are highly ranked values. Fertility refers to the capacity
of adopted theories (or kinds of theories) to frame research that generates or
contributes to generate knowledge and understanding of more and a greater
variety of phenomena. Comprehensiveness refers to the capacity of the totality
of adopted theories to generate understanding of phenomena, so that no kind
of phenomena (or aspects of them) of significance for human lives is excluded
from being adequately investigated and (in principle) coming to be understood scientifically. Fertility and comprehensiveness concern the capacity of
adopted theories to generate well-founded understanding of more and more
kinds of phenomena; they are values of adopted theories that are adhered to
because any theory that is adopted (regardless of its expected social value) is
expected to contribute to generating understanding of some set of phenomena. Nevertheless, they are not criteria for evaluating how adequate and well
founded is the understanding generated by a theory of a set of phenomena,
and so—although they often occur in lists of alleged cognitive values (see Section 2)—they are not themselves cognitive values.
A theory will not be adopted for any length of time unless its fertility is
evident; and a theory may be fertile for a time (producing well-founded
understanding of various sets of phenomena) and then cease to be, if it
fails to be able to encompass additional sets of phenomena (as Newtonian
theory, after two centuries of remarkable fertility, failed to encompass the
movements of newly discovered very small objects and objects with very
high velocities). However, even if a theory (or kind of theory) has been fertile
for a long time and continues to be so, and it appears likely that it will be
able to provide well-founded understanding of more and more phenomena
with no limit discernible, its scope may still be bounded, in the sense that
there are phenomena lying outside of it whose investigation would require
adopting other kinds of theories. For example, there appears to be no discernible limit to the scope of phenomena of which biotechnological theories
can provide well-founded understanding; but, since the categories that these
theories use are derived from molecular biology and genetic engineering, and
so do not include categories that can describe certain kinds of environmental
and health-related phenomena, phenomena investigated in agroecology and
public health lie outside of their scope. This example, as well as the discussion of decontextualizing theories in Section 4.3, illustrates that theories (or
kinds of theories) may display continuing fertility, but that does not mean
that by using them progress is being made toward the realization of comprehensiveness. Comprehensiveness would require that theories be adopted
so that both biotechnological and agroecological phenomena could come to
be well understood; and this may require the adoption of multiple kinds of
theories—including theories that currently are not adopted widely and, thus,
whose fertility has not yet been put to the test. The social value of phenomena
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(for example, those investigated in agroecology) that cannot be grasped under
currently adopted theories can provide a good reason to adopt novel theories
that might be able to grasp them, even when currently the potential fertility of
such theories may remain untested. Adopting them could contribute toward
furthering comprehensiveness.
Scientists and scientific institutions may disagree about the relative importance of fertility and comprehensiveness. Individual scientists normally tend
to choose to engage in research projects in which theories (or kinds of theories), whose fertility is already proven, are adopted; and this often reflects
the priorities and values of institutions in which the research is conducted
and the contingencies of obtaining funding for it. Adopting theories to investigate phenomena that lie outside of the scope of currently adopted fertile
theories—and hence potentially furthering comprehensiveness—tends to be
motivated by interest in these phenomena for those who adhere to particular social values. Longino, for example, is motivated to adopt novel theories
that have the potential to provide understanding of phenomena of particular
interest to those who hold feminist values (see Section 4.5). Fertility and comprehensiveness—and how their ranking varies across individual investigators,
their institutions, and different areas of scientific practice—are entangled with
social values. How explicit the entanglement is varies greatly with the context
and reasons for adopting a theory.
4.3

Decontextualizing Theories

Modern scientific practices have given rise to an impressive body of theories,
ranging over many scientific disciplines, whose adoption has been and continues to be demonstrably fertile. Moreover, as just indicated, scientists often
adopt a theory in research so that they can test whether or not its fertility
extends to a new set of phenomena. When they do so, it may still be the case
that social values are involved, alongside the value of fertility, in motivating
its adoption. This is not obvious, for a striking feature of exemplary scientific theories helps to disguise it. I call this feature decontextualizing (Lacey
2016). Virtually all the theories adopted in disciplines like physics, chemistry, and molecular biology represent the phenomena, of which they generate
well-founded understanding, in terms of their relations with (hypothesized)
underlying structures, the processes and interactions of the structures, their
components and (sometimes) their levels of organization, and the laws
(typically expressed in mathematical terms) that govern them, in a way that
dissociates them from their particular social, human, and ecological contexts,
from any link they may have with human agency, value, sensory qualities, and
social arrangements, and from whatever possibilities they may gain in virtue of their places in particular social contexts. For example, GM seeds and
plants can be investigated in decontextualizing theories (of molecular biology
and biotechnology) for their genomic and molecular biological properties,
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their processes, interactions, possibilities, and effects, but not for many of the
human, social, and environmental consequences that follow from using them
to serve particular social interests. To determine whether or not a decontextualizing theory is impartially held of a domain of phenomena, the relevant
empirical data are selected, sought out (often using mechanized surrogates for
human observers), and reported (or mechanically stored, manipulated, and
transmitted), using descriptive categories that generally are applicable in virtue of measurement, instrumental, and experimental operations. This does
not include data about, for example, who owns and uses GM seeds and plants
and under what conditions, or the impact of using them on biodiversity, the
interests of small-scale farmers, and worldwide food security.
Decontextualizing theories have been adopted almost exclusively in modern scientific research.
No doubt the fact that adopting them has proved to be remarkably fertile lies behind the view—a view which tends to be implicitly presupposed
in programs of scientific education and by agencies that fund scientific
research—that ‘decontextualizing’ is a property necessarily possessed by actually or potentially fertile adopted theories, and an essential part of scientific
methodology. Nevertheless, this view is unfounded. It fails to take into account
that theories (or kinds of theories) may display continuing fertility, but not
progress toward the realization of comprehensiveness. The impressive fertility
of decontextualizing theories leaves open that there may be phenomena or
aspects of them that cannot come to be understood without adopting theories
that do not decontextualize. This is not merely a logical point. There are many
phenomena that cannot be grasped in decontextualizing theories, those whose
identities are inseparable from their social, historical, and ecological contexts,
and that require adopting theories that do not decontextualize so that they can
be adequately investigated and scientifically understood. They include phenomena connected with, for example, human agency, social history, public
health, risks of and alternatives to technoscientific innovations, sustainable
ecological systems, how applying scientific understanding has changed the
world we live in and how adequately it has contributed to human progress (to
human well-being and social justice, as well as to technological progress and
economic growth). Furthermore, there are theories that are impartially held
of some sets of these phenomena, for example, in agroecology (Lacey 2015b,
2016). Thus, ‘decontextualizing’ is not a property necessarily possessed by an
adopted theory that is or can be fertile; and taking it to be an essential part of
scientific methodology is inconsistent with adhering to comprehensiveness.
4.4 Why Is ‘Decontextualizing’ Valued?
Adopting decontextualizing theories is central to the interests that motivate
and are served by modern scientific research. Contemporary scientific institutions ensure that plentiful funding is made available for research in which
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they are adopted, leaving research in which non-decontextualizing theories
are adopted largely marginalized and the phenomena they address underinvestigated. (For example, there is far less funding available for research
in agroecology than in biotechnology.) I suggest that the explanation lies
principally in the fact that decontextualizing theories (and only they) can
be counted on reliably to generate well-founded understanding that can
be applied to serve interests that reflect certain social values that are highly
embodied in leading modern social and economic institutions. These are
social values connected with what Bacon called ‘the domination of nature,’
or with enhancing human powers to control natural phenomena in ways
that contribute to technological and economic progress. While some applications of decontextualizing theories are almost universally valued (e.g., in
medicine), on the whole they serve especially well interests that embody values of technological progress and of capital and the market (Lacey 1999,
2016). This can be to the detriment of interests that reflect other values,
e.g., those I call values of social justice, democratic participation, and sustainability (Lacey 2015b, 2016), whose furtherance depends in many ways
on being informed by understanding obtained in research in which nondecontextualizing theories are adopted.
For example, adopting theories of molecular biology and biotechnology
(instances of decontextualizing theories) has given rise to GM crops, an innovation that has been introduced and used efficaciously in agricultural practices
in ways that serve interests of agribusiness that embody the values of technological progress and of capital and the market. Many who adhere to the values
of social justice, democratic participation, and sustainability, however, challenge the social value of many uses of GM seeds and plants, based on the claims
that they occasion unacceptable risks and inhibit the development of alternative agricultural practices that can be highly productive and at the same time
better embody their values (Lacey 2015b). These claims are open to scientific
investigation; and, since some of the alleged unacceptable risks may be occasioned by socioeconomic mechanisms, and relevant alternatives (for example,
agroecology) may not be based on using technoscientific innovations, gaining understanding of them requires adopting non-decontextualizing theories
(Lacey 2016). If these claims are to be empirically tested (and, consequently,
endorsed or rebutted), investigation would have to be conducted in which
non-decontextualizing theories are adopted. They may be dismissed out of
hand (as they often are) by stipulating that ‘scientific’ understanding is not
gained from research in which non-decontextualizing theories are adopted.
But that comes with the cost of truncated comprehensiveness and ‘scientific
investigation’ that often is unable to inform interests that embody the values
of social justice, democratic participation, and sustainability; and thus to provide adequate input into policy deliberations about the social value of using
GM seeds and plants.
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Entanglement of Social Values and the Values of Fertility and
Comprehensiveness

Fertility and comprehensiveness do not provide direction to scientific research
on their own; their roles when decisions are made to adopt theories are always
entangled with those of social values. Adhering to the values of technological progress and of capital and the market (and the professional interests of
many scientists) may lead to emphasizing the adoption of decontextualizing
theories whose fertility is well proven. In contrast, adherence to the values
of social justice, democratic participation, and sustainability may motivate
ranking furtherance of comprehensiveness ahead of developing only theories
whose fertility is well proven. For example, I interpret Longino to maintain
that adhering to feminist values may incline one to value the adoption of
theories that have such properties as ‘empirical adequacy, novelty, ontological heterogeneity, complexity, mutuality of interaction, applicability to human
needs, and contribution to decentralization of power (universal empowerment)’ (Longino 2008, 69). Consider novelty: New types of theories may
be needed to investigate context-implicated phenomena—including those
applicable to human needs, or that serve interests connected with the empowerment of women and impoverished peoples—that hitherto have not been
investigated, partly because they cannot be investigated in decontextualizing
theories. Moreover, as Longino maintains, they may be needed in order to
submit to more rigorous testing some theories, adopted in the biological and
behavioral sciences, whose adoption has been diagnosed to be influenced by
sexist assumptions. Consider ontological heterogeneity and complexity: Some
phenomena may have characteristics that can only be grasped in theories that
can represent forms of complex, ontologically heterogeneous organization
(for example, that present in agricultural ecosystems) that cannot be expressed
in decontextualizing theories. Adopting theories with the properties on Longino’s list of values thus holds the promise of movement in the direction of
furthering comprehensiveness. Feminist values can motivate adopting them
in research (albeit with their fertility not yet established) because of the social
importance of the phenomena that will be investigated, rather than sticking
exclusively with types of theories whose fertility is well proven.
Longino (2008) puts forward the preceding list of values—call it list (a)—in
the context of making an argument that the roles of cognitive and social values
are so entangled that no important methodological distinction can be drawn
between them. Her argument is perhaps the best known one that fits the general pattern discussed in Section 2. It rests on the definition of cognitive values
as ‘truth-indicative . . . or definitive of scientific understanding,’ (68) which
she takes to be equivalent to ‘good reasons for accepting . . . a theory’ (74). Like
other definitions in such arguments, and unlike the one I state in Section 1, it
does not facilitate distinguishing between the attitudes of impartially holding
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a theory of a specified set of phenomena, and adopting a theory. It also does
not recognize that fertility and comprehensiveness, values of adopted theories,
are not cognitive values. Longino begins her argument by juxtaposing list (a)
to a typical list of cognitive values (see Section 2)—list (b): empirical adequacy,
consistency with theories in other domains, simplicity, explanatory power/
generality, fertility, and refutability. (Empirical adequacy is the only item on
both lists.) Then, she argues that the items on list (b) have no more claim to be
considered cognitive values (according to her definition) than the items on list
(a), which she makes clear have been chosen because of their dialectical connections with feminist values; and, relatedly, that any consideration in favor of
identifying the values of (b) as good grounds generally for ‘accepting’ a theory,
rather than the items of (a), is also dialectically connected with social values.
Leaving aside empirical adequacy, her definition does not allow a list of items
to be identified that is not dialectically entangled with social values.
The definition, introduced in section 1, does allow this, and it leads to interpreting lists (a) and (b) differently. According to it, not all the items on list (b)
are cognitive values, although some (in addition to empirical adequacy) are,
for example, explanatory power and simplicity (in one of its various interpretations, namely minimization of ad hoc hypotheses). However, fertility is not
a cognitive value, but a value of adopted theories (see Section 4.2). Moreover,
none of the values on list (a), except empirical adequacy, is a cognitive value.
Nevertheless, although they have no proper role in judging that a theory is
impartially held of a set of phenomena, the values on list (a) may play roles,
alongside fertility and comprehensiveness, in choosing what theory to adopt
and what kinds of phenomena to investigate; and these roles are no ‘less scientific’ than the role played by ‘decontextualizing’ in mainstream scientific
activities. Thus, my conclusion, that the distinction introduced between cognitive and social values enables matters of methodological importance to be
made clear, remains untouched by Longino’s argument.

5. Role for Social Values: Endorsing a Theoretically
Articulated Claim
The importance of the distinction is also untouched by the fact that often
scientific research gives rise, not to impartially held claims, but to judgments of a kind that I call endorsements. A claim is endorsed, if (although
not impartially held) it is judged to be sufficiently well supported by available evidence to warrant acting or making decisions in ways informed by it.
Compare, for example, the claims: (1) The variety of GM crops, V, is resistant
to the herbicide, glyphosate; and (2) using V poses no serious risks to human
health or the environment that cannot be adequately managed. Note that (2),
because it is about such matters as health and the environment, does not fall
within the compass of the theories of molecular biology and biotechnology
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that gave rise to (1). For many varieties of GM crops, (1) is impartially held.
For most of them, (2) is not, however, because (for example) all plausible,
actually identified lines of research, which could produce results that would
lead to rejecting it, have not been adequately pursued, and others of the conditions (i)–(iii) (see Section 3) are not met, and (because of the complexity
of the situation and the short time available) are unlikely to be met before a
decision has to be made about using V. Nevertheless, (2) may be endorsed;
it may be judged to be sufficiently well supported by available evidence to
warrant using it to inform that decision. To endorse a claim is not to judge
that it expresses well-founded understanding. Rather, it represents a stance
taken in the time-constrained context of applying the impartially held understanding of phenomena gained in adopted theories—and so in the context of
human action and thus of social value. It is taken because a judgment made
about the ethical and social justification of (for example) using V needs to
take into account not only the efficacy of using V but also the collateral effects
of using it; and so it depends, not only on (1) being impartially held, but also
on (2) being reasonably endorsed. Endorsement is a provisional stance. Since
(i)–(iii) are not satisfied, it is possible (and not merely logically possible) that
a currently endorsed claim, like (2), might actually be false, and that further
empirical inquiry might lead to its subsequently becoming judged false.
What goes into making the judgment that claim (2), ‘using V poses no serious risks . . . ,’ is well enough supported empirically to justify using V and
informing policy deliberations about using V? In order to answer this, keep in
mind that, if actions and decisions are informed by a claim that is actually false
(although not known to be false), this could have undesirable consequences.
If decisions are informed by (2), but this claim is actually false, the consequences might include (for example) chronic toxic effects on the bodily organs
of some consumers of V. On the other hand, to refrain from acting informed
by (2) could mean that expected benefits would not be gained. Regulatory
bodies thus have to make a judgment—after considering the potential harmful consequences (and weighing them against the expected benefits) of acting
informed by (2), should it actually be false—about whether or not (2) is well
enough supported by empirical evidence to justify that actions informed by
it should not be challenged on the ground that it has insufficient empirical
support. They endorse (2) when they judge that it is well enough supported
in this way. Weighing potential harm against expected benefits involves social
(ethical) value judgments. What counts as ‘good-enough support’ depends on
them. The more serious (ethically, socially) the potential harm that is risked,
the stronger the support needs to be. (Toxic effects on bodily organs are more
serious than mild allergies.) If different parties adhere to different values and
so make different value judgments about the seriousness of the harm and
about how the balance is to be weighed, some may endorse (2) and others not,
without either being in conflict with available evidence. Thus, the grounds for
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endorsements, unlike those for theories and claims that are impartially held,
involve the entanglement of empirical evidence and social/ethical value judgments. Both cognitive and social values are in play. The social values are not
functioning as cognitive values, and they are not evidence or substitutes for
evidence. They function to identify what counts as sufficiently strong evidence
(Douglas 2009, 96).
Scientists, in judging that a claim is impartially held, do not make (social/ethical) value judgments. Insofar as they themselves make endorsements, they do.
Regulatory bodies often expect (and contract) scientists to make endorsements
that inform their decisions. Moreover, these bodies (and parties interested in
implementing uses of technoscientific innovations) often treat endorsements
of claims like (2), and the more general claim that planting GM crops and
using their products poses no risks, provided that appropriate regulations are
followed, as technical results that have comparable cognitive status to that of
impartially held claims. To treat them in this way, however, is effectively to grant
a place to the social values, adhered to by the scientists, alongside the cognitive
values in appraising the cognitive value of these theoretically articulated claims,
and to treat provisional claims as having comparable status to impartially held
understanding that needs no further investigation. Treating them in this way
is facilitated, when—as in the pattern of argument in section 2—the attitudes
of impartially holding, adopting, and endorsing are all lumped together as a
single attitude, ‘accept.’ But, scientists, qua scientists, have no special authority
concerning social (or ethical) value judgments, and so endorsements that they
make carry no special authority. Endorsements made by regulatory bodies, if
they are to be creditable (albeit provisionally) in democratic societies, should
draw upon the full range of empirical data that scientists can make available to
their deliberations, including data relevant to testing claims articulated with the
categories of non-decontextualizing theories. But they are not technical judgments properly made by credentialed scientists; and the value judgments they
involve should be outcomes of deliberations carried out in appropriate democratically constituted forums. The distinction between cognitive and social
values thus serves to make clear that endorsed claims have different cognitive
status than impartially held judgments do, a difference crucial for identifying
the roles that various kinds of scientific results should play in deliberations
leading to the formation of public policy.

Note
1 The lists proposed are not always identical, and this has occasioned some critical comment
(Rooney 1992). See Lacey (1999) for a fairly exhaustive and documented list of items that have
been called “cognitive values” by various philosophers. We will see in Section 4.5, that not all
items on Longino’s list are among the exemplary cognitive values listed in Section 1. Douglas
(2013) has proposed interesting distinctions among cognitive values, their characteristics, and
the roles that they play, but addressing them is beyond the scope of this paper.
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